Adversarial ML
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OSCP and CEH in 2026: What Carries Over to AI Red Teaming
A free OSCP and CEH study offer raises the question every pentester should answer: which of those skills transfer to AI red teaming, and which do not.
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LLM Attack Taxonomy: Injection, Jailbreaks, Agent Abuse
A practitioner's map of LLM attack classes: direct and indirect prompt injection, jailbreaks, RAG poisoning, and agent tool-call abuse, mapped to OWASP.
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The Adversarial ML Attack Taxonomy: A Red Teamer's Reference
A working taxonomy of attacks against ML systems, covering evasion, poisoning, privacy, and abuse, mapped to attacker access and aligned to NIST and ATLAS.
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Why Red Teaming Cannot Certify Governance Claims
A position paper formalizes the mismatch between what AI governance frameworks ask evaluators to verify and what behavioral red teaming can actually show.
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ARSM: A Defense Pipeline for Medical LLM Agents
ARSM-Agent chains six defense stages, from input risk perception to output control, for medical LLM agents. What each stage catches and where gaps remain.
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Prompt Injection Examples: A Practitioner's Attack Library
A technical breakdown of real prompt injection examples across direct, indirect, multimodal, and RAG-poisoning attacks, with payloads and conditions.
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Automated Jailbreak Attacks and the Transfer Problem
How automated attack generation works — PAIR, GCG, and TAP — why jailbreaks port across model families, and what that does to an assessment's threat model.
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AI Red Teaming Hub: Your Guide to Offensive AI Security
The central index for offensive AI security on this site: prompt injection, jailbreaks, adversarial ML, red team methodology, and the tooling behind it.
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LLM Bypass Techniques: Attacks on Alignment and Guardrails
LLM bypass techniques span adversarial suffixes, alignment-removing fine-tuning, and guardrail evasion, with defenses for each attack layer.
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LLM Jailbreak Techniques: Attack Taxonomy and Defenses
LLM jailbreak attacks include roleplay, encoding, many-shot prompts, and multi-turn escalation, while layered controls limit their impact.